Abstract: This work examines apportionment of multiplicative risks by considering three dominance orderings: first-degree stochastic dominance, Rothschild and Stiglitz's increase in risk and downside risk increase. We use the relative nth-degree risk aversion measure and decreasing relative nth-degree risk aversion to provide conditions guaranteeing the preference for "harm disaggregation" of multiplicative risks. Further, we relate our conclusions to the preference toward bivariate lotteries, which interpret correlation-aversion, cross-prudence and cross-temperance.
Introduction
Since Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) showed the simple lottery pair characterization for such concepts of risk apportionment as risk prudence and temperance by the idea of "harm disaggregation", plenty of both theoretical and empirical/experimental research has explored preferences over various lottery pairs.
Consider the statistically independent random variables X i , Y i , i = M, N. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger's (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2006) work by defining relatively "good" and "bad" via stochastic dominance. Recently, Ebert et al. (2018) reinterpreted their observation as "mutual aggravation of risk changes". Although Jokung (2011) and Denuit and Rey (2013) . among others, developed previous results to the bivariate framework, most researchers focus on additive lottery pairs.
Decision-makers often face multiple risks that are multiplicative. For example 1 , a firm may face a random pre-tax profit and a random tax rate simultaneously; an employee may get a random nominal wage income, while suffer the impact of a price deflator. Thus, we pay attention to the multiplicative counterpart of additive lotteries: Eeckhoudt et al. (2009b) and Wang and Li (2010) , among others, use this type of multiplicative lottery pairs to explore "multiplicative risk apportionment", but restrict X M = 1 and Y M = 1 − k (0 < k < 1); Chiu et al. (2012) and Denuit and Rey (2014) also investigated similar lotteries with an additive risk or elementary correlation increasing transformations, but still assumed X M and Y M are different constants.
In this work, the multiplicative 50-50 lotteries allow that X M and Y M take random variables; however, X i also dominates Y i , i = M, N, by three well-known dominance orderings: first-degree stochastic dominance, Rothschild and Stiglitz's increase in risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) and downside risk increase (Menezes et al. 1980) , which are extensively used to characterize risk changes. 2 Let u(x) be the utility function of decision-maker, denote as RRA (n) the coefficient of relative nth-degree risk aversion (x) . 3 We present the relationship between the multiplicative lottery preference ordering with
, the coefficient of relative risk prudence
and so on. Similar to previous literature on optimal decision-making under risks 4 , our conclusion depends on the comparison between RRA (n) and benchmark value n. Moreover, we find it is meaningful that RRA (n) is compared to benchmark value 2n. Combining with discussion of benchmark values for RRA (n) , under the assumption of decreasing RRA (n) , which characterizes the effect of wealth level on the strength of risk aversion 5 , we further provide some sufficient conditions for the multiplicative lottery preference ordering.
Our work proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present our model and explain multiplicative risk apportionment in terms of both "harms disaggregation" (Eeckhoudt et al. 2009b ) and "mutual aggravation of risk changes" (Ebert et al. 2018) . Section 3 shows the main result. Section 4 applies our model to discuss the concepts for correlation-aversion, cross-prudence and cross-temperance. Section 5 concludes this work.
Model
We start by reviewing three dominance orderings: first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD), Rothschild and Stiglitz's increase in risk (RSIR) and downside risk increase (DRI). Let F and G be the cumulative distribution functions of two random variables with supports contained in [a, b] .
, with strict inequality at some x, which implies F has a bigger mean than G. 6 F dominates G via RSIR if G is obtained from F by a sequence of mean-preserving spreads (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) . Similarly, F dominates G via DRI if G is gotten from F by a sequence of mean-variance-preserving transformations (Menezes et al. 1980) Ekern (1980) generalized these dominance orderings to nth-degree risk increase, which corresponds to FSD, RSIR, and DRI when n = 1, 2, 3, respectively. For convenience, this work also use the term "nth-degree risk increase" to represent these three dominance orderings.
Definition 1. F dominates G via nth-degree risk increase if: (
Moreover, this inequality is strict for some z. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Menezes et al. (1980) , among others, linked these dominance orderings to the sign of derivatives of utility function within the expected-utility framework. Define that decision-maker u(x) is nth-degree risk
See, e.g., Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) and Liu and Neilson (2018) , among others. Here, u (n) (x) = d n u(x) dx n . 4 For more details, we refer to Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) and Chiu et al. (2012, p. 160) , among others. 5 For more details, we refer to Franke et al. (2006) , Jokung (2013) , among others. See, e.g., Ingersoll (1987) . 
Without loss of generality, we assume M ≤ N. For Mth and Nth-degree risk aversion decision-maker, Y i is a "relatively bad" risk, i = M, N. Thus, the lottery A means one of both "harms" occurs for certain, whereas the lottery B means both "harms" occur simultaneously or neither occur. That is, following Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , we can state A B as the preference for "multiplicative harm disaggregation".
Under the expected-utility framework, A B is equivalent to
In the above inequality, the left side indicates utility reduction due to both risk changes from X i to Y i , i = M, N, simultaneously. The first (second) term in the right side represents utility reduction due to risk change from X M (X N ) to Y M (Y N ). Thus, A B exhibits a preference for facing risk increases one at a time to suffering two risk increases at once. That is, following Ebert et al. (2018) , we can explain A B by borrowing terminology "mutual aggravation" Kimball (1993) of multiplicative risk changes rather than "harm disaggregation".
Main Result
Firstly, we have the following conclusions for A B. 
(iii) When M = 3, N = 3, A B if and only if
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Following Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For Nth-degree risk aversion decision-maker u(x), when M = 2, N = 2 or 3, suppose one of the following conditions holds:
Proof. It is evident to obtain (ii) and (iii) by observing Equation (2). Next, we show (i). When 2N − RRA (N+2) ≤ 0, by (iii), Equation (2) holds. When 2N − RRA (N+2) ≥ 0, we complete the proof as follows. By Equations (4) and (5), under RRA (N+1) ≥ N, decreasing RRA (N+1) means
and
Thus, we have
The first inequality in Equation (8) is obtained by Equation (6). The second inequality holds since (RRA (N+2) − 1)(2N − RRA (N+2) ) has the maximum value N(N − 1) at RRA (N+2) = N + 1 when Equation (7) holds. Then, recalling (ii) in Proposition 1, by Equation (8), we show A B.
Decreasing RRA (n+1) means the increase of wealth level will decrease the degree of risk aversion. Condition (i) in Corollary 1 uses decreasing RRA (N+1) to characterize the sufficient condition for A B. Franke et al. (2006) and Jokung (2013) , among others, clarified the role of decreasing RRA (N+1) on multiplicative risk vulnerability. Here, we reveal how decreasing RRA (N+1) guarantees preference for "multiplicative harm disaggregation". For example, when M = N = 2, by Corollary 1, if the coefficient of relative risk prudence, which is above 2, is decreasing in the wealth level, then a risk aversion decision-maker exhibits the preference ordering: A B. As a product, we further confirm the exploration about decreasing RRA (N+1) is helpful for analyzing optimal decision-making with multiple multiplicative risks.
Condition (ii) in Corollary 1 suggests the preference trait may have a reversal as the changes in the dominance ordering between X M and Y M . Since, for a decision-maker with RRA (N+1) ≤ N, when M = 1, Result (i) in Proposition 1 implies she exhibits a preference for mutual aggravation of multiplicative risks, i.e., A B; however, when M = 2, if RRA (N+2) ≥ N + 1 holds, then she exhibits a preference for "multiplicative harm disaggregation", i.e., A B. Nevertheless, Condition (ii) still argues n is a kind of benchmark value for RRA (n+1) . In fact, in the literature, besides n, RRA (n+1) is also compared to other benchmark values. For example, Gollier (2010) and Denuit and Rey (2014) , among others, chose n − 1 as a benchmark of RRA (n+1) . Condition (iii) of Corollary 1 shows RRA (N+2) ≥ 2N alone is sufficient to guarantee A B, which proposes another larger benchmark value 2N for RRA (N+1) noting that 2N ≥ N + 1. By (i) in Proposition 1, we know RRA (N+2) ≥ 2N ⇒ A B when M = 1. This means a strong enough preference for A B with M = 1 is sufficient to assure A B with M = 2.
There are similar sufficient conditions for the case of M = 3 and N = 3.
Corollary 2. For prudent decision-maker u(x) (i.e., u > 0), when M = 3 and N = 3, suppose one of the following conditions holds: (i) RRA (4) ≥ 3, RRA (5) ≥ 4 and decreasing RRA (5) ; (ii) RRA (4) ≥ 3, RRA (5) ≤ 4 and RRA (6) ≥ 5; or (iii) RRA (4) ≥ 3 and RRA (6) ≥ 9. Then, A B.
Proof. The proof is similar to Corollary 1. Please see Appendix A.
To exhibit the economic interpretation of our results, we place emphasis on three dominance orderings: FSD, RSIR, and DRI. 8 For the case of higher-degree risk increase, one can get similar conditions to Proposition 1, and (ii) and (iii) in Corollaries 1 and 2 by a little complex mathematical derivation; however, we realize that it is not straightforward to generalize (i) in Corollaries 1 and 2 by the method of proofs. Some additional conditions should be introduced, since, for example, as shown in the Appendix, the second inequality in Equation (A5) does not hold when M = 3, N = 4.
Applications

Relate to Multiplicative Risk Apportionment
The lottery preference on our multiplicative 50-50 lotteries extends the concept of "Multiplicative risk apportionment" by Eeckhoudt et al. (2009b) and Wang and Li (2010) . They introduced the following special lotteries:
where, following from Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , Schlesinger (2008, p. 1331) , among others, argued there is little empirical literature considering the case of nth degree risk increase, n ≥ 4.
Obviously, according to Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , 1 + A n has more nth-degree risk than 1 + B n and x FSD x(1 − r). Thus, the preference between A * n+1 and B * n+1 is a special case of our conclusion. The result of Eeckhoudt et al. (2009b) and Wang and Li (2010) is relatively intuitive and simple. However, the characterization is less simple for higher orders. This paper provides a way to characterize generalized multiplicative risk apportionment via lottery pairs.
Relate to Preferences over Bivariate Lottery Pairs
We now adopt the bivariate utility function 10 v(x, y) = u(xy) (u > 0, u < 0) to investigate the work of Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) . Assume zero-mean risks:˜ andδ are statistically independent. Let supp[x + ] denote the support of x +˜ . Similar notation also applies to y +δ. When the two variables are multiplicative, following Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) , we know that cross-temperance is equivalent to [(x + ) y; x(y +δ)] [xy; (x +˜ )(y +δ)]. Since x +˜ and y +δ dominate x, y, respectively, via RSIR, by Corollary 1, we have the following corollary. Similarly, by Proposition 1, we have the following conclusion which covers the lottery pairs interpretation about the coefficients of relative risk aversion and relative prudence in Eeckhoudt et al. (2009b) , Wang and Li (2010) . As discussed by Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) , the economic and financial decisions under risks often involve many attributes. Our conclusions can be used to examine intertemporal consumption choices with two multiplicative arguments. Thus, our work also extends the interpretations of Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) on the signs of cross-derivatives of utility functions.
Conclusions
This work is devoted to providing conditions for preferences over multiplicative additive lottery pairs. We extend previous results on multiplicative risk apportionment by restricting our work on the three dominance orders: first-degree stochastic dominance, Rothschild and Stiglitz's increase in risk and downside risk increase. Surprisingly, we find decreasing relative nth-degree risk aversion can be used to analyze preferences for "multiplicative harm disaggregation". This extension is helpful to motivate further study on multiplicative risk apportionment.
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